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ABSTRACT

In disaster/battlefield applications, there may not be any centralized network that
provides a mechanism for different nodes to connect with each other to share important
data. In such cases, we can take advantage of an opportunistic network involving a
substantial number of mobile devices that can communicate with each other using
Bluetooth and Google Nearby Connections API(it uses Bluetooth, Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE), and Wi-Fi hotspots) when they are close to each other. These devices referred to as
nodes form a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN), also known as an opportunistic network. As
suggested by its name, DTN can tolerate delays and significant loss of data while
forwarding a message from source to destination using store and forward paradigm. In
DTN, it is of critical importance that the network is not completely flooded and also the
message is not tampered or corrupted and readable only to the destined node.
Three algorithms have been implemented in the Android platform. The first
algorithm [1] focuses on intelligent data transfer based on each node’s interest and
encourages each node to participate in data transfer by providing incentives and keeping
track of the trustworthiness of each node. The second algorithm [2] focuses on the security
of the transferred data by fragmenting both data- and key-shares with some redundancy
and the destination node can resurrect the original data from the predefined minimum keyand data-shares. The third algorithm focusses on using object detection models and
interest-based authorization using [3] to securely transfer and access data across DTN. The
corrupted nodes are identified by using one-way keychain hashes created by source/relay
nodes for a message which are validated at the destination node.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of mobile
devices, and these devices have the capability to communicate with each other using peerto-peer technologies such as Bluetooth, BLE, and Wi-Fi hotspots. In disaster/battlefield
scenarios there may not be any centralized network like LAN to facilitate connection
among these devices. In such cases, it is necessary to pass on important information from
the source device to the destination using wireless links. In such cases, the mobile devices
can form their own wireless opportunistic network referred to as Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTN). DTN is formed by a collection of nodes and each node interacts with other nodes
only when they are within a short distance. Unlike traditional end-to-end connections, DTN
has intermittent connections only when two nodes are nearby each other. Instead of seeing
the intermittent connection as a disadvantage, DTN utilizes it for sharing relevant
information between the nodes to forward the message to the destination node. Thus,
message transfer from a source node to the destination may pass on through various
intermediary nodes resulting in delay and significant data loss.
In this thesis, we focus on the implementation details of three algorithms; two are
based on [1] and [2] and the third one is newly proposed. Reputation and Incentive-based
DTN [1] focuses on intelligent data transfer between nodes, based on the interests set by
the node and interests accumulated as the result of interaction with other nodes. Incentives
are provided to encourage nodes to participate in data transmission. Distributed Reputation
Metric (DRM) is like a local database maintained by each node, which contains a value
corresponding to the trustworthiness of each encountered node based on the message
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received from it, the quality of the message, the message’s annotation relevance, etc. When
the nodes connect, the DRM is shared between them. This scheme reduces flooding of the
network, creates multiple copies of the original data based on the interests between two
connected nodes, and ensures that all the nodes participate in the data transmission and also
try to suppress corrupted nodes.
The secure forwarding through fragmentation in DTN [2] overcomes delay, data
loss, and insecure data transfer between nodes by fragmenting and creating redundant dataand key-shares. Thus, the destination node can resurrect the original data if it contains a
minimum number of predefined key- and data-shares.
Lastly, in the newly proposed DTN algorithm, we have used Attribute-Based
Encryption(ABE) [3] to design interest-based authorization to securely transfer and access
data across DTN. We also keep track of intermediate nodes in the message path to identify
malicious nodes using µTESLA algorithm [4]. Furthermore, we have used deep learning
object detection models on an Android device to reduce the message size by identifying
objects of interest from the device’s camera.
The thesis is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of
related work in the field of data routing in DTN and implementation of DTN and image
object detection in the Android platform. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to various
APIs and libraries that have been used in the implementation. Section 4 provides the
background to understand the actual implementation, this involves explaining the
algorithm and overall architecture of the system, as well as the implementation of DTN
and object detection in the Android app with various modules, message formats, and
screenshots. Section 5 provides a conclusion for the thesis.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. CHITCHAT
Doug et al. [5] proposed a novel solution to achieve a high message delivery rate
without flooding the DTNs. In this paper, each node has a set of interests called Direct
Interests, which represents the interests of a node. Transient Interests of a node represents
the set of interests that the node accumulated by meeting other nodes. When two nodes
interact with each other, a decay function is applied to the interests. Next, they exchange
the interests, and the growth function is applied to the modified new set of interests. Each
created message is annotated with a set of keywords or interests. Once the growth function
has been completed, the routing protocol is applied to decide whether a message with
certain interests needs to be transferred to the connected node. This enables the message to
have a high probability of reaching the set of users who are interested in that message.

2.2. REPUTATION AND CREDIT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
Himanshu et al. [1] proposed an incentive and reputation model on top of ChitChat
algorithm [5]. In this scheme, the messages are annotated with keywords describing them
and the relay nodes are encouraged to add more keywords so that the message contains real
time information. This is especially useful in volatile situations like disaster/battlefield
environment. The incentive model encourages users to participate in message transfer
without turning into selfish nodes to preserve energy and storage capacity. The reputation
model prevents the nodes from adding inappropriate keywords to the message.
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2.3. MOBICENT
Chen et al. [6] proposed an incentive mechanism on top of existing DTN routing
protocols. By providing incentives, even selfish nodes are encouraged to participate in
relaying the message to the destination. Mobicent assumes that the underlying system uses
cryptographic techniques like Onion Routing to prevent free riding, any strategies by
participants to override the system, and disputes among relays and clients. A Trusted Third
Party (TTP) calculates the payment that will be charged to the client, and two algorithms
are available to the client to choose from. One minimizes the message delay and the other
minimizes the payment. One of the limitations of Mobicent is that it uses TTP for both key
management and payment services to relays.

2.4. RELICS
Uddin et al. [7] proposed a novel scheme that considers the trade-off between
energy consumption and the cooperation of nodes for data transmission in DTN. When a
message is delivered to the destination node, the destination node assigns a rank or real
value to a set of relay nodes for that message and it will be shared with other devices. This
rank directly impacts the node in a way that relay nodes favor to forward message from a
high-ranking node than the ones with a lower rank. This study [7] also provides an
algorithm for intelligent transfer of a certain number of messages based on energy
consumption. Since most of the nodes are either mobile or sensor devices it is really
important to give utmost importance to the energy savings (as they have limited energy)
rather than giving top priority to forwarding the messages in the network.
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2.5. MOBIGAME
Wei et al. [8] proposed a user-centric, reputation-based incentive protocol for DTN.
This scheme uses game theory to decide whether a node should receive or forward a given
message. Each message has a limited time to reach a destination, which is called Time To
Live(TTL). If a message received by a relay node has expired it is called a bad bundle. Each
relay node gets a reward only if it successfully forwards the message to the other relay
nodes or destination and provides proof of that to its predecessor. Using game theoretical
analysis, [8] proves that each node transfers only the good bundle to the relay nodes and
avoids being a malicious node to receive rewards.

2.6. MULTI-PARTY ENCRYPTION(MPE)
R. Cabaniss et al. [9] proposed a novel scheme for security in DTN. In traditional
end-to-end connection, public-key cryptography is easily achieved by using a trusted key
repository to verify which node is associated with a particular public key. However, in
DTN, a node may not have access to the public key of all nodes and there is no trusted key
repository. Thus, [9] proposes two schemes to ensure security: i) Chaining and ii)
Fragmentation. Chaining is similar to onion encryption, in which the source message is
encrypted with multiple public keys of relay nodes, and when each relay node receives the
message, it removes its layer of encryption and replaces it by encrypting using the public
key of the destination node if it is available. The node otherwise replaces it by encrypting
using the public key of any other relay node. This increases security but reduces delivery
time. In fragmentation, multiple copies of the original data are created. Threshold
encryption is used in which n keys are created and k keys are required to retrieve the
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original message, where k<n. Each message copy is encrypted with a key-share and passed
along the network. When the destination receives k key fragments, it can retrieve the
original data.

2.7. SECURE SECRET SHARING
Parakh et al. [10] proposed a secure secret sharing scheme on top of Shamir’s
secret sharing algorithm. The proposed method can hold k-2 secrets of size b into n keyshares. The destination requires at least k key-shares to retrieve the secrets, where k < n.
This method is especially useful in the DTN environment as the data loss is high and the
connection may be interrupted at any time. The secrets may store the private key to decrypt
the original message or other vital information related to the message.

2.8. INFRASTRUCTURE MODE BASED DTN ON ANDROID DEVICES
Ippisch et al. [13] explored the use of Wi-Fi hotspots in Android devices to create
a DTN network from a set of devices. Since the Android system requires user intervention
to accept connections in Wi-Fi Direct and Bluetooth, this study uses Wi-Fi hotspots, which
can connect and transfer data automatically without user intervention in the background.
The Spray and Focus routing protocol are used with TTL for each message. The application
also makes use of GPS services, which helps to formulate location-based rules to enable
hotspots that in turn help to conserve battery. When two devices are connected they
exchange meta-information that contains information about the network, and the metainformation helps to make optimized message-forwarding decisions. Finally, the study [13]
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focuses on analyzing energy consumption, transmission range and speed of Wi-Fi hotspots,
and the encryption and decryption speed in the varying devices and data sizes.

2.9. OPTIMIZING CAUCHY REED SOLOMON-CODES
Cauchy Reed Solomon (CRS) codes were already introduced in the 1990s;
Optimized CRS [11] tried to improve its performance drastically so that a small number of
computations are needed to perform, which in turn saves energy. CRS codes are used to
create n fragments of a message, and from that, we need at least k fragments to resurrect
the original message, where k<n. This data fragmentation comes in handy especially in
DTN, and this study helps to reduce the energy consumption in creating fragments and
retrieving the original data as the mobile devices have limited battery power at any given
time.

2.10. SECURE FORWARDING THROUGH FRAGMENTATION IN DELAYTOLERANT NETWORKS
Shudip et al. [2] proposed a scheme to forward messages in a secure way in DTN,
especially in disaster/battlefield environment where multiple parties may work together. In
such scenarios, it is difficult to use public-private cryptography as one group may not have
access to the public key of other groups as there will be no central infrastructure. To
overcome this limitation, the study proposed to encrypt the message and fragment both key
and encrypted message with some redundancy before passing along the DTN. Since DTN
has high data loss, this redundancy helps the destination node to retrieve the original
message with fewer key and data fragments than created at the source.
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2.11. DTN ON ANDROID PHONES
Yanggratoke et al. [12] were one of the first to implement DTN in the Android
platform. They assume a simple DTN routing protocol and explain the overall system
architecture for Android implementation. The architecture includes a background service,
a user interface to interact with the service, and an Android TCP/IP stack which interacts
back and forth with the background service. The authors discuss the challenges of
implementing DTN in the Android system. Performance in terms of bandwidth and battery
power consumption is also analyzed.

2.12. CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
The study [3] proposed a scheme in which messages are encrypted with policy and
it can be decrypted if the attributes or condition specified in the policy are satisfied at the
destination. Each user has a private key representing a set of attributes and the message is
encrypted with a policy over these attributes. The authors provide various optimization
strategies to reduce decryption time. The authors guarantee that this scheme is resistant to
collusion attacks. This scheme is closely similar to traditional access control protocol such
as Role-Based Access Control(RBAC).

2.13. AI BENCHMARK: DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS ON ANDROID
The authors [14] explored various mobile hardware chipsets such as Qualcomm,
HiSilicon Chipsets, and MediaTek Chipsets which provide dedicated APIs to run deep
neural networks using hardware acceleration. Various neural network frameworks for
mobile devices such as TensorFlow Lite, Theano, and Caffe2 are explored and their
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advantages and disadvantages are described briefly. Android Neural Network
API(NNAPI) provides a layer of abstraction, enabling developers to run neural network
operations on different chipsets without having to write separate code for each chipset
using its designated API. NNAPI provides a unified framework for working with hardware
for neural network operations. Finally, various deep learning tests such as image
recognition, face recognition, and segmentation are performed with different convolutional
neural networks such as Inception-V3, and MobileNet on different mobile devices with
varying RAM and hardware chipsets. A detailed comparison report is presented at the end.
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3. API’S AND LIBRARIES

Some of the important APIs and libraries that helped to fasten the implementation
and improve the efficiency of the overall system and core components of the
implementation are discussed here.

3.1. GOOGLE NEARBY CONNECTIONS API
Google Nearby Connections is an API developed by Google for making peer-topeer networking with Android devices simple and secure and performing data transfers at
a high bandwidth. Traditionally, developers need to write separate code to make use of
Bluetooth, BLE and Wi-Fi hotspots. It is a very tiresome task and end users’ intervention
is needed to accept connections from a nearby device. To solve that problem, this API
leverages the strength of Bluetooth, BLE and Wi-Fi hotspots while circumventing their
respective weaknesses. It performs advertising, discovery, and connections with nearby
devices in a fully offline peer-to-peer manner. Furthermore, based on a connection with a
nearby device, it automatically decides whether to use Bluetooth or Wi-Fi Hotspots and
end-user intervention is not needed to switch them on. Using this API, it is possible to send
a large volume of data between two Android devices at a high speed.

3.2. JPBC AND JAVA REED-SOLOMON LIBRARY
Java Pairing-Based Cryptography(JPBC) [15] is an open source library and in our
implementation, it is used to create public and private keys using Elliptical Cryptography
and to perform proxy re-encryption which will be explained in section 4. Java Reed-
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Solomon Library helps to fragment a data into n blocks and at least k blocks are required
at the destination to retrieve the original data, where k<n.

3.3. TENSORFLOW OBJECT DETECTION API
The Tensorflow Object Detection API [16] was built by Google to make the process
of multiple object detection in a single image as easy as possible. It is built on top of the
TensorFlow framework and simplifies the process of training and deploying object
detection models. This API provides a wide range of configuration files that depict the
layers of Convolutional Neural Networks(CNN) such as MobileNet and Inception models.
The developer can modify these files to set the training and validation size, threshold value,
batch size, etc. This API also provides an easy way to perform transfer learning which
helps to reduce the training time. Once an object detection model is trained, it can be
converted to the relevant format such as the .pb format or .tflite format. Tflite format stands
for TensorFlow Lite, which is especially useful for deploying the models in mobile or
embedded devices.

3.4. TENSORFLOW LITE
TensorFlow Lite is a framework which helps to run inference on TensorFlow
models in mobile, IoT, or embedded devices. It is designed to be lightweight and optimized
for small devices. The pre-trained models should be converted to TFLite format. TFLite
format reduces the size of the model and helps to perform inference in limited memory
constraints. TensorFlow Lite internally uses NNAPI, which in turn helps to optimize the
process of solving computationally intensive tasks by distributing the workload across on-
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device processors, such as dedicated neural network hardware, graphical processing units
(GPUs), and digital signal processors (DSPs). In case such dedicated hardware is not
available in a mobile or embedded device, TensorFlow Lite then requests NNAPI to
optimize the code to execute requests on the CPU.

3.5. JAVA REALIZATION FOR CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED
ENCRYPTION
Java realization for ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption [17] provides java
implementation of [3] for generating public and master key from a set of attributes e.g.
[‘soldier’, ‘army’, ‘disaster’, ‘flooding’]. The private key is generated from the subset of
previously used attributes such as [‘army’, ‘soldier’]. The message is encrypted with a
policy. The policy contains attributes and k out of n feature, where k<n such as [‘army
soldier 1of2’]. Thus, the encrypted message can be decrypted if the private key was
generated with either ‘army’ or ‘soldier’ as one of its attributes.
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4. DESIGN OVERVIEW & IMPLEMENTATION

This section provides a design overview and implementation details of three studies
of DTN algorithms that have been implemented in the Android platform.

4.1. STUDY 1: REPUTATION AND CREDIT-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISM
FOR CONTENT ENRICHMENT IN DTN
4.1.1. Background. Himanshu et al. [1] proposed an incentive scheme in DTN in
order to encourage all the nodes to participate in relaying the information to the destination
nodes. This is important because in real-time scenarios the nodes may turn selfish in order
to conserve battery and memory, which are limited in mobile devices. Each message has a
set of keywords or annotations describing it. The incentive provided for each received
message is calculated based on various factors like the reputation of the source device,
interest comparison between the message and the receiving device, and the quality of the
message. Himanshu’s method [1] allows relay nodes to improve the message description
by adding more content as needed. This is especially suitable in battlefield/disaster
scenarios, e.g. in a disaster situation an image of a dangerously broken building may be
sent to the fire department as the destination via relay nodes so that necessary actions can
be taken by the fire department. As time evolves, relay nodes can add the relevant keywords
while forwarding this message so that the destination can have appropriate knowledge
about the current situation.
In order to prevent nodes from becoming malicious by adding inappropriate
keywords for a message, [1] introduced the Distributed Reputation Model (DRM), in which
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each relay or destination node can rate the source and other relay nodes based on the quality
of the message, relevance of the keywords, etc.
The incentive and reputation models are built on top of the DTN routing algorithm
called ChitChat [5]. ChitChat has been designed for users with small devices like Android
or iOS smartphones that have the capability to connect with nearby devices. Each user can
list a set of preferences or interests that describes the user well by listing keywords such as
“ice-cream”, “trekking”, etc. These interests are called the direct interests of the user. Each
user also accumulates a set of interests called transient interest, which is the aggregation of
interests obtained by meeting other nodes and learning their interests, too. This is really
helpful to get an idea about what kind of users each user meets and this information is
useful in making message-forwarding decisions. A device is a destination if the message
keywords are in sync with the direct interests of the device (i.e. user). In ChitChat
algorithms, two modules play an important role one is the Real-Time Transient Social
Relationship (RTSR) module and the other is the ChitChat Routing module. Each interest
is associated with weights, and direct interests always have a minimum weight of 0.5. All
the interests cannot have a value greater than 1. When two devices with the ChitChat app
gets connected, the RTSR module is first invoked. The RTSR module performs decay
function on both direct and transient interests to better reflect their recent relationships with
other nodes.
4.1.1.1. Decay algorithm. When two devices, U and V, are connected with each
other, the RTSR module is invoked, which in turn executes the decay algorithm in the
respective devices. Once the interests are updated, the latest interest and their weights are
exchanged between the devices. The decay algorithm is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Decay Algorithm.

Wn – New weight, Wp – Previous weight, β – Decay constant, Tc – Current
timestamp, Tl – previous timestamp at which device with interest I was connected.
This decay function is formulated in such a way that interests with high weights
reflect that the node frequently meets other nodes with that interest and low weights
corresponds to the node rarely meeting other nodes of that interest. Once the interests are
shared, the RTSR module then executes the growth function to update the weightage of its
interests based on the shared interest obtained from the other device.
4.1.1.2. Growth algorithm. The growth algorithm takes 3 factors into account:
one is the weightage of the interests in the device U at time Ts, the time duration for which
the 2 devices are connected Tc – Ts, and finally, a growth dampening factor ѱ that is based
on the relationship of interest I in devices U and V. Interest I may be a direct interest in
both U and V or a direct interest in U and a transient interest in V, while ѱ can take a value
between [1, 6] depending on various cases such as those mentioned above. Since the
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Weights can only be between 0 and 1, the min function is used to prevent the interest
weights from exceeding 1. The Growth algorithm is shown in Figure 4.2.
Δ – Change in weight, Wv(I) – Weight of interest I in device V, Tv – Time at which
V established the connection, Ts – Time at which device U and V are connected, ѱ – Growth
dampening factor, Wn – New weight of interest I in node U, Wp – Previous weight of interest
I in node U.

Figure 4.2. Growth Algorithm.

4.1.1.3. ChitChat routing module. Once the RTSR module is done, the ChitChat
routing module is executed to identify relevant messages to forward to the connected
device. This prevents the device from forwarding messages that have a low probability of
reaching the destination via the connected relay. It helps to conserve battery in both the
devices. Each message is annotated with a set of keywords or interests. The sum of weights
of those interests is calculated in device U and the interest obtained from device V during
the decay phase. A message is forwarded only when device Sv > Su.. Sv refers to sum of
interests for message M in device v and Su refers to sum of interests for message M in
device u.
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4.1.1.4. Incentive mechanism. The incentive mechanism is credit and reputationbased. Both of these factors affect the incentives given to a device. This section explains
the credit-based part. Each node is initialized with a value of incentive tokens that can be
used for message dissemination and content enrichment. When a source or a relay node
forwards a message to another relay node, it promises a certain number of incentive token
from a destination node on the successful delivery of the message. A relay follows the same
process that a source follows. If a relay A transfers message to relay B, A receives a fraction
of incentive from B, if B has a high probability of delivering the message to the destination.
The study [1] explains various factors involved in credit-based incentive calculation.
4.1.1.1. Distributed Reputation Model (DRM). The motivation for developing
this model is to reduce the number of malicious users who might try to add irrelevant tags
to the message in the pursuit of acquiring more incentive tokens. To overcome this
problem, a recipient node (another relay node or destination node) can rate the source or
other relay nodes of a message. The source is rated based on the message quality and added
tags while the relay node is rated based on any of the tags added as part of content
enrichment. Rating of a node is the average of ratings of messages received from that node.
The device shares this rating with the next hop in the path of message traversal to the
destination. The destination utilizes these ratings to decide the number of incentive tokens
to be awarded to the delivering node. The study [1], explains in detail about the reputation
part in incentive calculation.
4.1.1.2. Data flow between connected devices. Figure 4.3. displays the data flow
between two connected devices, Alice and Bob. Once connected, the RTSR Module is
invoked, it executes the decay algorithm and shares the interests along with the reputation
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of the other devices. Once the interests are shared, the growth algorithm is executed and
relevant messages are transferred to Bob’s device by invoking the message router. These
executions are performed in Bob’s device as well. Once the messages are received, the
users can enrich the message by adding relevant tags and also provide ratings for source
and relays nodes (DRM) with respect to the received message.

Figure 4.3. Flow of Information between the Connected Nodes [1].

4.1.2. Implementation Details. The DTN application [1] is implemented using
the Android operating system and makes use of Google Nearby Communications and
Bluetooth to transfer message between devices. It works on devices running on Android's
KitKat (API 19) to Oreo (API 26) version.
Figure 4.4 displays the home screen of the app. The “Messages” icon allows the
user to view the created messages and the messages received from other devices. The
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“Interest” icon allows the user to list their set of interests and also view their transient
interests. The “Send to IP” icon allows the user to send all the images and their metadata
to the specified IP address. The “Device Ratings” icon lets the user view the DRM database
and modify it. The two icons on the right end allow the user to switch the connection mode
on and off. When the connection mode is switched on, the device is in a transfer-ready
mode which allows messages to be transferred and received from nearby devices.

Figure 4.4. Home Screen of the DTN App.

Figure 4.5 displays the app’s setting screen. The users can set their preferences to
only receive messages from a particular location, and set of tags using the “Pull” mode,
and “Push” mode to receive all messages based on the ChitChat algorithm. The “edit”
button on the bottom right corner of the screen in Figure 4.5 allows the user to set location,
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a radius around a given location, and preferred interests for setting up the “Pull” mode. The
user can choose the type of connection for peer-to-peer data transfer, either Google Nearby
Connections API or the Bluetooth connection exclusively. Each user is given a credit of
300 when the app is first installed, thus allowing them to participate in the DTN by
spending some credits to receive the messages. The app can be reset to default by clicking
on the “Reset All” button.

Figure 4.5. Setting Screen.

Figure 4.6 shows the message creation, where users can select an image from the
gallery or capture an image through the device’s camera, and Google Cloud Vision API
generates a list of tags describing the image. From these tags, the top two tags are set as
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keywords. However, users can still edit or add more tags to the list. Each message is
associated with a list of metadata such as GPS coordinates of where the image was taken;
timestamp of the image; the incentive paid, received, and promised for that message; the
unique ID of that message; and the filename of the image.

Figure 4.6. Message Creation Screen.

When two devices with our app are in communication range, they get connected,
and the connected device's name is displayed to the user. The ChitChat and Incentive
algorithm runs in the background to determine which messages and how many messages
to send to the connected device. Once the transfer is complete, the devices get disconnected
and search for other devices. The message format remains the same for each message
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across the network as shown in Figure 4.7. The “Message” part contains the multimedia
message along with its unique Msg ID, keywords describing it, and the format type of the
message. “Meta-information” contains data such as latitude, longitude, and timestamp.
Finally, the “Node information” stores the node ID that generated the message, and the
Recipients ID stores the list of node IDs through which the message was passed on.

Figure 4.7. Message Format for DTN.

Figure 4.8 shows the “Interests” screen, where the user can view the created
interests. Initially, the default value is 0.5 for each created interest and varies as the device
participates in the message transfer. The user can also view the accumulated interests by
toggling the spinner to select “Transient interest” at the top right end of the screen. The
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user can delete any interest by just swiping them to the left, and add new interests by
clicking on the “plus” button at the end of the screen as shown in Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.8. Interests Screen.

Figure 4.9 displays the list of received messages for a device. On clicking each
image, a user can view the metadata associated with the message, including the amount of
incentive paid for that message. The user can rate the intermediate nodes for that message,
which will later be exchanged with other devices. This, in turn, affects the reputation and
incentives given to the intermediary nodes. Thus, all the intermediary nodes are encouraged
to enrich the content, and not to add irrelevant tags. Clicking the three dots at the right end
of each message allows the user to rate the intermediary nodes, open Google Maps to view
the location where the received image was taken, or delete the message. The two rounded
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buttons at the bottom right end allow the user to create a message either by selecting an
image from the gallery or opening the camera to capture a new image.

Figure 4.9. Received Messages.

Apart from these, there is also a feature to send all the messages along with their
metadata and intermediary nodes information to the base station/server using an IP address
with designated port. The left image in Figure 4.10 displays the screen where the user can
enter the IP address and transfer all the data by clicking on the “Send To IP” button. For
this feature to work, the device must be connected to the internet. The image on the right
in Figure 4.10 displays the received messages stored in the server (basic java socket
programming is used for the implementation). The received messages are stored in the file
path in the pattern of /DTN/Device_ID/Month_Data/Unique_Message_ID. For each
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message, two files are created on the server. One is the actual image and another one is a
text file (.txt) that contains the metadata for that message.

Figure 4.10. Send to IP Screen.

4.2. STUDY 2: SECURE FORWARDING BY FRAGMENTATION IN DELAYTOLERANT NETWORKS
4.2.1. Background. Shudip et al. [2] proposed a scheme that can be used in volatile
situations like disaster/battlefield zones where multiple groups under different authorities
are operating and need to share information securely. There may not be any central network
infrastructure in such volatile situations, and as an alternative, opportunistic networks like
DTN can be used by making smartphones act as nodes. To avoid malicious intent,
messages need to be secured within and across different groups.
Traditional public-private key cryptography will not work in this situation due to
the non-availability of the infrastructure. Encrypting data with a symmetric key and then
fragmenting both the key and data before disseminating through the DTN helps to
significantly reduce the probability of a message being compromised by some unauthorized
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node. However, in this fragmentation process, few redundant fragments are created to
increase the probability of a message being delivered to the destination node in such an
environment. Thus, for each message, x number of key-shares are generated with hidden
information related to the decryption of the original message. Out of x key-shares, we need
at least y key-shares to obtain the hidden information where y <x. Similarly, the encrypted
message is fragmented into n data-shares that contain some parity blocks to improve the
delivery rate of the message. Out of n data-shares, at least k data-shares are needed to obtain
the original message where k<n. In order to verify that each key- and data-share is not
corrupted before decryption at the destination, an integrity check is also set up which helps
in conserving the device’s battery. Each device also has a unique ID that it receives from
the cloud server by connecting to the internet before it can perform any other operations.
The four important modules are:
•

Key handler

•

Data handler

•

Key Integrity Checker

•

Data Integrity Checker

An overview of all these modules is presented in the following sections:
4.2.1.1. Key handler. This module generates a public-private key using Elliptical
Cryptography (EC) when the application is run for the first time on the device and it
remains the same for consecutive runs. The public-private key is of size 1024 bits and 160
bits respectively. Next, whenever a device creates a new message, it creates a random
symmetric key of size 256 bits using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) which will be
used to encrypt the message. Using the Recursive Secret Sharing (RSS) [10] algorithm

27
over Shamir’s scheme we generate 8 key-shares with the AES key, the public key of the
source node (SN), and any other information related to the message as secrets. At the
destination node (DN), we need at least 4 key-shares to retrieve the secrets.
The number of key-shares for each message is constant throughout the network and
each key share is 32 bytes. The SN generates a number of proxy re-encryption keys using
its own private key and the public key of the intermediary node. Each of the key-shares is
encrypted with one of these proxy re-encryption keys. Thus, INs on receiving key-share
proxy re-encrypted using its public key can act a source to that key-share. Instead of
decrypting, the IN re-encrypts the key-share with proxy re-encryption keys generated using
its own private key and the public key of the DN (if available) or another available IN.
Only the DN decrypts the key-shares once it obtains a minimum of 4 key-shares and
retrieves message-related secrets. An overview of the algorithm to send message from one
device to another is shown in Figure 4.11.
4.2.1.2. Data handler. When a message is created, it is encrypted using a random
symmetric key generated using AES by executing the key handler module. The message is
split into n data-shares, and the data shares are encoded using Cauchy Reed Solomon
Erasure Code (CRS) [11]. Out of n data-shares, we need at least k data-shares at DN to
retrieve the original message where k<n. When an IN receives a data-share it just forwards
it to the next IN or DN. When a DN receives a data fragment, it first checks whether it has
obtained a minimum number of key-shares to retrieves the secrets. Then it checks whether
it has received a minimum number of data fragments. If both requirements are satisfied,
the AES symmetric key (secret) is obtained from the key-shares, and then CRS decoding
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is performed on the data-shares. Using the AES symmetric key obtained from the keyshares, the encrypted message is decrypted to obtain the original message.

Figure 4.11. Algorithm to Send Data D.

The number of fragments n for a message and a minimum number of fragments k
to retrieve the original message can be varied based on different scenarios as follows:
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•

Static data fragmentation: In this mode, n and k are constant across the
network. Thus for each message, the number of fragments remain the same.
Sometimes it is not useful, as even for a small message more fragments will
be created.

•

Dynamic data fragmentation: In this mode, the parameters n and k are
decided based on the message size, where k<n. This is particularly helpful
for small messages; however, it incurs extra computational overhead as the
value of n and k needs to be sent as one of the secrets at the source.

•

Priority-based data fragmentation: Each message has a priority value
associated with it. The higher the priority value, the higher the number of
fragments that are created for that message. This increases the probability
of that message reaching the destination in a short time.

Figure 4.12. Algorithm to Receive Data D at Destination.
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There are n data fragments for a message and DN needs at least k data fragments to
retrieve the original message. The first k fragments are the original data fragments and n-k
fragments are additional coded fragments. DN can wait to receive the first k fragments to
avoid data decoding which takes quadratic time to execute. This helps to conserve the
battery. The destination node can detect a faulty key-share or data-share only after
performing decrypting or decoding respectively. In order to avoid wasting battery power,
the destination node first performs key and data integrity checks to ensure that all the
received fragments are not corrupted due to transmission errors or malicious nodes. An
overview of the algorithm to receive data D at destination is shown in Figure 4.12.
4.2.1.3. Key integrity check. If a key-share is corrupted, the DN will only know
when it tries to retrieve the secrets from the key-shares using RSS. In order to save the
computation time and cost, the source creates a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) using the hash
values of each key-share. Then the source appends the relevant MHT node values to each
key-share so that the MHT root can be generated from it. Thus, when a DN has a minimum
number of key-shares and tries to retrieve the secrets, it first generates the MHT root for
each share and selects those key-shares whose root values are common and rejects the odd
ones.
4.2.1.4. Data integrity check. Similarly, if a data-share is corrupted, the DN will
know about it only after performing CRS and decryption using the AES key. In order to
avoid the computation cost and time, we sign each data-share at the source with the source’s
private key. At DN, when it has a minimum number of data- and key-shares, before
performing CRS, the signature of each data-share is verified using the public key of the
source which is obtained as a secret from the key-shares.
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Figure 4.13. Secure Data Flow between Connected Devices.

4.2.1.5. Data flow between connected devices. Whenever two devices connect to
each other, each device’s unique ID and the public key are first exchanged. Message ID is
a unique ID for each message, its format is DeviceID_ithmessage_generated. For example,
if a device with ID 2 generates the 3rd message, its message ID will be 2_3. Each message’s
data and key-share have a unique ID associated with them. The two devices exchange 3
types of messages.
•

The direct message is sent only when the source creates a message and it
meets the destination directly. In such a case, the original message prior to
fragmentation is set as the direct message.
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•

From storage, the source device collects a key and data-share of all
messages for which the connected device acts as an IN, i.e. for all the
message for which the connected device is not the destination and no keyor data-share for that message has already been sent to this device
previously. This collection is bundled together and set as an Intermediary
message.

•

Destination message is a collection of data and key-shares of all messages
for which the connected device is the destination.

For each key-share, the user needs to create a proxy-key using the stored public key
of any of the IN or DN. Only IN with which the proxy-key has been generated can perform
proxy re-encryption and acts as a source for that key-share and only DN performs
decryption of the key-shares and no IN needs to perform any decryption activity. The
overall data flow between the two connected devices is shown in Figure 4.13.
4.2.2. Implementation Details. Secure Forwarding through fragmentation in DTN
is implemented over the Android operating system and it makes use of Google Nearby
Connections API to communicate between devices. It works on the devices running on
Android's KitKat (API 19) to Oreo (API 27) version. For each device, the user must first
connect to the internet and obtain a one-time unique device ID from Google’s Firebase
Realtime Database. The user can start using the app only after receiving the device ID.
Using elliptical cryptography, the public-private key for the device is initialized and
it remains the same for the lifetime of the app on that device. Figure 4.14 shows the home
screen of the secure forwarding app. The user can create a new message by clicking on the
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“Camera” button and capture an image through the device’s camera. Once the image is
captured, the user can choose the preferred mode of data fragmentation as specified in [2].

Figure 4.14. Home Screen for Device ID:5.

Figure 4.15 shows message creation with different modes of data fragmentation
that the user can choose from. The user can input the destination device ID in the
“EditText” field, which is available above the “Create key + data shares” button. Upon
clicking the “Create key + data shares” button, the image is encrypted with the random
AES key. They AES key along with necessary message-related information such as the n
and k values of the data-shares (k<n) and the public key of the source node, is kept as the
secret and 8 key-shares are created using RSS. Out of 8 key-shares, DN needs at least 4
key-shares to retrieve the secret. After creating the key-shares, the Key Integrity Module
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will be invoked, and that creates an MHT with these key-shares. The Key Integrity Module
appends relevant node values (hash values) to each key-share so that the MHT root hash
value can be recreated from it. Using the CRS algorithm, data fragmentation is done based
on user preferences.

Figure 4.15. Message Creation with DN 3.

Figure 4.14 shows that when a user clicks on the “Own Message” button, the user
can view the created messages and then clicking on a message, the user can view the dataand key-shares for that message as shown in Figure 4.16. For each key-share, the user needs
to create a proxy-key using any of the available public keys of IN. It is to be noted that if
the public key of DN is available, then all the key-shares are encrypted with the proxy-key
that was created using the private key of SN and the public key of DN. Encryption of a
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key-share using the proxy-key of any available IN is done by clicking a key-share and that
allows the user to select any of the devices’ IDs from a drop-down list. Upon clicking on
the “Generate Proxy key” button after selecting an IN’s device ID, a proxy-key is generated
with that IN and they key-share is encrypted with that proxy-key.

Figure 4.16. Data- and Key-shares of a Message.

Each data- and key-share have certain attributes associated with them as shown in
Table 4.1. Figure 4.17 shows the screen in which the user can select an IN to create a proxykey and encrypt the key-share. If the device does not have any public key of other devices,
it just sends a key-share to an IN without encrypting it.
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Figure 4.17. Proxy-key Generation and Encryption for a Key-share.

Table 4.1. Data- and Key-share Attribute Description.
Attribute

Description

Key-

Data-

share Share
Msg ID

Msg ID is of the form DeviceID_ithMessageGenerated.

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

It denotes the message to which the corresponding
fragment belongs to.
Type

Denotes whether a fragment is a key-share or a datashare.

Share ID

Key-shares have an ID in the range [4, 11] and datashares have ID starting from 1.

Destination

Denotes the DN’s ID for which the message was

ID

created.
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Table 4.1. Data- and Key-share Attribute Description (Cont.).
Status

Denotes whether the fragment has been transferred to

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓



any IN or not.
Sender Info

It hold the ID of the device to which the fragment has
been transferred, else it has the value of NA(Not
Applicable)

Proxy-key

Displays the device ID using which proxy-key was
created to encrypt the key-share

In Figure 4.14, upon clicking the “Enable” button, the application searches for
nearby Android devices. Once they are connected, the public key and device ID are
exchanged. Based on the connected device ID, the application checks whether the user has
created any message for that device. If it finds such messages, it directly sends the original
message to the connected device. For all data- and key-shares for which the connected
device is not the DN, the application will first check each message whether any of the keyor data-share have already been previously shared with that device. If previously not shared
with the connected device, it selects one of the key- and data-share of that message to send.
Lastly, the device will send all the data- and key-shares of all messages for which the
connected device is the DN.
As shown in Figure 4.18, all these messages are bundled together and sent to the
connected device in a single transmission. The device also receives messages from the
connected device. The data- and key-shares are stored appropriately in the storage based
on the role of the device for that fragment (i.e. either IN or DN). For each data-share
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received for which the device acts as the DN, it checks whether 4 or more key-shares are
present and whether the secret has been retrieved. If not, it waits for the minimum number
of key-shares for that message before proceeding further. If 4 or more key-shares are
received for a message, then the key-shares are decrypted. The integrity of each key-share
is verified by generating the MHT root hash value. The common MHT root is taken as the
valid root hash value and the remaining odd values are discarded as the corrupted ones. If
4 or more key-shares are present even after discarding these values, then the device
executes the RSS algorithm over the key-shares to obtain the secret. The secret mandatorily
includes the AES key that is used to encrypt the image and the SN’s public key. This secret
is stored in the internal memory of the DN until the original message is retrieved.

Figure 4.18. Bundled Message Format.
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Next, the device checks whether k (the minimum number of data-shares required at
the DN to retrieve the original message) or more data-shares are obtained for that message.
If the answer is yes, then the device checks the integrity of each data-share by verifying
whether it was signed by the SN using the SN’s public key that was obtained as the secret.
The corrupted data-shares are discarded. Even after discarding, if there are k or more datashares, CRS algorithm is executed to merge the data-shares into a single encrypted image.
Now the image is decrypted using the AES key obtained as the secret. Once the final
message is obtained, it is stored in the internal memory so that the user can view it later
along with its associated data- and key-shares.

Figure 4.19. Message 5_1 Retrieved at Device:3.

Figure 4.19. shows the messages received by Device 3 for which it is the DN. In
the same figure, message 5_1 can be seen, which was created by device 5 with device 3 as
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the DN as shown in Figure 4.15. Figure 4.18 can be viewed by clicking on the “Destination
Message” button present in Figure 4.14.
The study [2] has been simulated using “The One” simulator in Java programming
language. In the earlier simulation phases, the testing environment included multiple virtual
nodes on a single Java program. An elliptic curve used to generate the public and private
keys is randomly generated and one instance of an elliptic curve is shared across all the
nodes. However, due to the lack of synchrony across multiple Android devices, the random
instances of elliptic curves are no longer identical. Thus, the app is bootstrapped with a
predefined elliptic curve using curve parameters and elements that are written into a file
(bundled with the app) to generate public and private keys and perform cryptographic
operations from the same elliptic curve.
4.2.3. Performance Analysis. The Android studio provides a tool called “Profiler”
which helps to keep track of the performance of the app. Figure 4.20 shows the performs
of the app when computationally intensive tasks like encryption/decryption are performed.
The encryption and decryption process involves Key Handler/Key Integrity Checker
module and Data Handler/Data Integrity Checker module. Other operations such as peerto-peer message transfer using Nearby Communications API are not tracked as the API
takes care of the underlying connections and data management and hence cannot be
modified. From this tool two major computationally intensive tasks encryption/decryption
are analyzed for a single message. During such tasks, the app consumes almost 40% of the
CPU utilization. The average memory used by the app is 60MB during such tasks. The tool
describes energy consumption in three levels; light, medium and heavy. The energy
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consumption of the app varies from light to medium utilization. The analysis has been done
on Pixel 2 virtual device running on Android Pie 9.0 (API 28).

Figure 4.20. Performance Analysis of Secure Forwarding DTN App.

4.3. STUDY 3: INTEREST-BASED AUTHENTICATION USING CIPHERTEXTPOLICY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION IN DELAY-TOLERANT
NETWORKS
4.3.1. Background. In a disaster/battlefield environment, different parties may
come along and work together and it is necessary that each information is sent to the

42
concerned parties in a secure way. Each party is associated with a set of attributes or
interests e.g. Airforce party may be described by [‘Fighter planes’, ‘Jet’]. In such a
scenario, interest-based authentication becomes really useful to provide access to data in a
way similar to traditional role-based access control. The messages are encrypted with
policy and the destination node can decrypt only if the policy is satisfied. A policy contains
a set of attributes (or interests) and a condition, stating the minimum number of attributes
to be present in the private key (generated from a set of attributes) to decrypt the message.
It is also useful to send an image message rather than a text message. A single image
helps to convey the situation more clearly than many text lines. For this reason, while
implementing DTN on Android, images along with associated metadata are considered as
a message. However, due to battery and memory constraints, it is important to keep the
messages as short as possible in the DTN environment. For example, images of a broken
building or enemy soldiers need to be sent to the relevant interested parties. In such a case,
it is a waste of memory and energy consumption to send an image with background
information. In addition, it is also invaluable to provide a short description of the interesting
object to the user. Thus, deep learning models are used to detect interesting objects. In
recent times, performing object detection with Android devices has improved a lot, which
provides low latency, low memory constraints, low battery consumption, and improved
accuracy. Some of the best object detection algorithms are Faster-R-CNN (Regional Neural
Network), YOLO (You Look Only Once) and SSD (Single Shot Detector). Out of these,
we have used SSDLite MobileNet V2 for object detection on Android devices. One of the
primary reasons for using this model is that it has few parameters than other object
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detection algorithms and the FPS (Frames per second processed) is relatively higher, which
makes it suitable for real-time object detection [18].
The overall architecture of the system is shown in Figure 4.21. The important
components of [3] in DTN are as follows:
•

Master key generator and Edge Servers

•

Delay-tolerant network nodes

•

Trusted path measurement

•

Object detection

4.3.1.1. Master key generator and Edge servers. At the start of the system, all
the attributes that are associated with each edge server are collected. Using ABE, these
attributes are used to generate public (7128 bits) and master (156 bits) key. The master key
is used for the generation of the private (5464 bits) key.

Figure 4.21. Architecture of ABE in DTN.
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The edge servers are in the second layer of the architecture. When they are first
initialized, they send a subset of attributes to the MKG and receive the private and public
key from MKG. Edge servers distribute these keys to the DTN nodes when they are first
initialized into the system.
4.3.1.2. Delay-tolerant network nodes. The DTN nodes are responsible for
message encryption/decryption and message transmission from source to the destination.
When a node is first initialized, it connects to the relevant edge server based on its interest
and receives the public/private key. For example, an army edge server may have a private
key generated from the attributes [‘army’, ‘soldier’]. A node connecting with this edge
server will receive the private key from these attributes and will be able to decrypt
messages encrypted with these attributes via a policy. A message may be encrypted with a
policy such as [‘army fire 1of2’] which implies that the destination node should have a
private key generated from a set of attributes containing either ‘army’ or ‘fire’ or both.
4.3.1.3. Trusted path measurement. In order to find the corrupted nodes in the path
of message traversal from source to destination, the keychain-based approach is used. A
keychain is a one-way backward chain of the hash outputs of a predefined hash function
(SHA-256) where the first key kn is created randomly. Then the next key kn-1 is created by
the hashing of kn and we keep hashing until we get k0. The MKG creates a set of keychains
for all the edge servers. When an edge server connects to the MKG, it receives keychains
for its own and also receives the keychains of other edge servers. Instead of sending all the
hash values, MKG sends only kn and k0 for each keychain. Similarly, when a node gets
connected to the edge server it receives all the keychains from the edge server.
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In Figure 4.22, the source node selects one of the keychains and obtains k4 (i.e. kn)
from its storage before transferring a message created by it. Next, it creates a keyed hash
using SHA-256 from k4 and the IDs of source S and intermediate node I1. It also sends k3
and IDs of S and I1 to I1. When I1 meets another intermediate node I2, it creates a keyed
hash from k3 and IDs of I1 and I2. This keyed hash along with previous keyed hash values
generated for this message is sent to I2. k2 along with IDs of I1 and I2 is also sent to I2. The
same process continues when I2 meets I3 and when I3 meets the destination node. When the
destination node receives k0, it obtains k4 from its storage which was previously obtained
from the edge server on initialization. From k4 and the pair of IDs associated with each
hash, the destination node recalculates and validates all the hashes associated with the
message. By validating, the destination node can identify the malicious nodes. Any node
which might have contributed to altering any hash or path information will be kept out of
consideration for further distribution of data.

Figure 4.22. Hash Chain Created by Source/Relay Nodes for a Message.
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4.3.1.4. Object detection. SSDLite MobileNet V2 is an object detection model
designed by Google to more efficiently run inference on this model on mobile and
embedded devices. The base network of this model is MobileNet V2 which makes use of
depthwise separable convolution and efficient handling of linear bottlenecks.

Figure 4.23. Residual Blocks [18].

Depthwise separable convolution helps to minimize the computation by reducing
the number of addition and multiplication operations. In depthwise separable convolution,
the convolution operation is split into two smaller functions. The first operation is
depthwise convolution and it performs convolution to a single input channel at a time. For
example, there are 3 channels for an RGB image, and depthwise convolution performs
convolution by applying a filter or kernel to a single channel at a time. Thus, the number
of kernels should be the same as the number of input channels. Depthwise convolution is
succeeded by pointwise convolution. Pointwise convolution performs a linear combination
on the output from depthwise convolution. It is a 1x1 convolution operation with N filters.
From [18] it is known that depthwise separable convolution has k2 reduced computation
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than standard convolution operation, and k is the size of the kernel in the depthwise
convolution. MobileNet has k=3, which in turn reduces the computation cost up to 8 to 9
times compared to the standard convolution operation.
As the number of layers increases, deep neural networks can act as universal
approximators, especially in computer vision problems. However, there is an upper bound
on the number of layers added which results in improvement of accuracy. The increased
number of layers may result in problems such as vanishing gradients and curse of
dimensionality. All these problems are overcome by using residual networks in which
output from one layer is skipped a few training layers and connected with another layer as
shown in Figure 4.23.

Figure 4.24. Inverted Residual Blocks [18].

In this way, the deeper layers have access to earlier activations that were not
modified by the in-between convolutional blocks. From the diagram, it can be seen that the
residual blocks are in the pattern of wider-narrow-wider in regards to the number of
channels. This is the traditional pattern when residual blocks are used. However,
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MobileNet V2 uses inverted residual blocks as shown in Figure 4.24. Here the pattern
follows a narrow-wider-narrow approach in regards to the number of channels in the input.
The author specifies that, when both the patterns are implemented, it is observed that
inverted residual blocks have fewer parameters than the traditional approach.
It is important to have non-linear activations in neural networks; it helps to make
neural networks act as a good approximator. ReLU(Rectified Linear Unit) is one of the
frequently used non-linear activation functions in deep neural networks which discard
values smaller than 0. Thus, there is some kind of information loss that occurs in each layer.
This is overcome by increasing the number of channels to increase the capacity of the
network. However, in the inverted residual model, the layers are squeezed and skip
connections are established. Thus the author proposed the idea of linear bottlenecks in
which the last convolution of the residual block has a linear output before it is added to the
initial activation from the skip connection. MobileNet V2 uses batch normalization after
every convolutional block and it uses ReLU6 as the activation function.

Figure. 4.25. MobileNet V2 Architecture [18].

49
SSDLite MobileNet V2 contains an SSDLite layer at the top for object detection.
SSDLite is a trimmed-down version of SSD. The overall architecture of MobileNet V2 is
shown in Figure. 4.25. The first layer of SSDLite is attached to layer 15, and the rest of the
SSDLite layer is added on top of the last layer of MobileNet V2, shown in Figure 4.25.
The symbol t represents the expansion rate of the channel, c represents the number of input
channels, n represents how often the block is repeated and lastly s represents the stride
used.

Figure 4.26. Setup Screen of ABE DTN App.

4.3.2. Implementation Details. MKG server and edge servers are created using
Java socket programming. The implementation details are explained based on the demo
performed. For the demo, the system is bootstrapped with MKG server and two edge
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servers. The MKG server runs on port number 5000 and creates a public/master key based
on the following attributes [‘army’, ‘soldier’, ‘disaster’, ‘flooding’]. One of the edge
servers is Battlefield edge server and it is associated with the attributes [‘army’, ‘soldier’]
and it runs on port number 5001, while the other one is Disaster edge server, its attributes
are [‘disaster’, ‘flooding’] and runs on port number 5002. All the ABE related operations
are implemented using [17].
When the system is first initialized, MKG server is run first and it creates a
public/master key. Based on the number of edge servers it creates a set of keychains using
SHA-256 for each edge server. Next, the edge servers are initialized. During initialization,
they request the MKG server by passing their associated attributes to receive public/private
key and also the keychains. Once the edge servers are initialized, DTN nodes can be
initialized.
Figure 4.26 shows the setup screen for the Android app. The node can choose the
edge servers it wants to connect to or choose an intermediate node option which restricts
the node functionality to just receive and forward messages. In order to connect to the edge
server, the node must be connected to the internet. On clicking the “Setup” button, the node
receives the public/private key, unique device ID and keychain from the edge server which
will be stored in the internal storage of the device. Figure 4.27 displays the “Homescreen”
of the app. “Homescreen” displays the unique ID of the device and also the set of attributes
from which its private key has been generated. Thus, a message encrypted with policy
using these attributes can be decrypted by this node if it satisfies the policy conditions too.
In Figure 4.27. on clicking “Soldier detection”, the app displays a single screen
where it converts the live video feed from the device’s camera into frames of size 640x480
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and feeds the cropped frame of size 300x300 to the object detection model at the rate of
135FPS in Pixel 6 Android device (Virtual device). Once the objects are detected, the
relative box coordinates are returned by the model that is used for drawing bounding boxes
on the detected objects on the screen. The app also provides an option for the user to save
detected objects in storage.

Figure 4.27. Homescreen of DTN ABE App.

On exploring various object detection models, SSDLite MobileNet V2 is the most
effective in terms of accuracy, lesser parameters, and lesser computation (i.e. lesser
addition/multiplication operations) [18].From Table 4.2. it is clear that another efficient
mobile-friendly object detection algorithm YOLO v2, has 20 times more computation and
10 times more parameters than SSDLite MobileNet V2 when trained on COCO dataset.
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MobileNet models provide a good tradeoff between resource utilization and accuracy.
They are often coined as “mobile-first” architectures. In SSDLite MobileNet V2, the base
MobileNet model use depthwise separable convolutions and inverted residual blocks which
makes them insanely fast, small, and remarkably accurate, and makes them easy to tune
for resource vs. accuracy.
In order to develop an object detection model, the first stage is obtaining the training
and testing data. For this purpose, 650 images of soldiers were scraped off from the internet
and 250 images of normal civilians are taken from INRIA Person Dataset [19]. The civilian
images are added to prevent the model from detecting civilians as soldiers as both have
almost the same features. The training data consists of 800 images and the evaluation data
consists of 100 images out of the total of 900 images. For all the training/testing data,
ground truth box for soldiers and civilians are created using LabelImg utility [20].

Table 4.2. Performance Comparison of SSDLite MobileNet V2 with Other Object
Detectors on the COCO Dataset [18].
Network

mAP

Params

Madd

CPU

YOLO V2

21.6

50.7M

17.5B

-

MNet V1 +

22.2

5.1M

1.3B

270ms

22.1

4.3M

0.8B

200ms

SSDLite
Mnet V2 +
SSDLite

Using TensorFlow Object Detection API, SSDLite MobileNet V2 model was
configured and transfer learning was done from training on COCO dataset. Thus, the model
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already knows the features to detect humans in an image. This reduces training time and
improves accuracy.

Figure 4.28. Mean Average Precision(mAP) Graph.

Figure 4.29. Total Loss Graph.

The training was continued until the mean average precision (mAP) was steadily
increased and the overall total loss was very much reduced. From the graphs in Figure 4.28.
and 4.29 from TensorBoard, we identified any training beyond this worsened the accuracy
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of the model as it was overfitting with the training data and performed poorly on the
evaluation dataset. In Figure 4.28 the horizontal axis denotes the training steps and the
vertical axis denotes the mAP values. Similarly, in Figure 4.29 the horizontal axis
represents the training steps and the vertical axis denotes the total loss value. Once the
model is trained, it is converted to a frozen graph in which information unnecessary for
inference are removed, so that the size of the model is very much reduced. The frozen graph
has .pb file format and the model’s size was about 18 MB.

Figure 4.30. Soldier Detection in Android App.

The .pb file format is converted to TFLite format so that the Android device can
make use of NNAPI to improve the runtime of inference on this model. Converting models
to TFLite format reduces the model size and provide optimizations without reducing the
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accuracy drastically. An example of such optimizations is to convert the model to a
quantized model which reduces the precision of values and operations within the model to
reduce the time required for inference. The model size was 17 MB after converting to
TFLite format. Figure 4.30 shows the screen where a soldier has been detected and
displayed to the user.

Figure 4.31. Messages Screen.

In Figure 4.27, on clicking the “Gallery” button, the user can select images from
the device’s gallery to create a message. All the images selected will be added to the
database which can be viewed on clicking “Messages” button. On clicking the “Messages”
button in Figure 4.27, the app displays the “Messages” screen as shown in Figure 4.31.
The user can view the created messages by selecting “My msgs” spinner in the ActionBar.
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The user can view the decrypted messages (i.e. it the destination node for those messages)
by selecting “Received msgs”. For all those messages which cannot be decrypted by the
device will be considered as an intermediate message and will be forwarded to other
devices on contact. Intermediate messages can be viewed by selecting “Intermediate msgs”
in Figure 4.31. The messages are displayed as a list containing filename and message status
(i.e., encrypted or not).

Figure 4.32. Message Details Screen.

If the message was created by the device, the message will be displayed by selecting
“My msgs” in Figure 4.31. On clicking on the message, the metadata associated with the
message is displayed as shown in Figure 4.32. The user can enter the policy for the message
to be encrypted in EditText. Policy disaster fire 1of2 implies that the destination node
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should have a private key generated from disaster or fire or both. By clicking on “Encrypt”
button the message will be encrypted and stored in the database. The metadata associated
with each message is shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Metadata Associated with ABE DTN App Message.
Attribute

Description

Msg_ID

Msg ID is of the form DeviceID_ithMessageGenerated. It
denotes the message to which the corresponding fragment
belongs to.

Filename

Contains the image filename

Source_ID

Contains the ID of the device which created the message

Path

Contains the path where the image is stored in the device

Type

Refers to the type of message for that device. Can be own,
intermediate or received message for a device

CipherPath

Refers to the path where the encrypted message is stored in the
device

Policy

Contains policy used for encryption of the message

HashInfo

Contains the hashes created by each device the message
traveled through (for trusted path measurement)

Num_nodes_travelled Number of intermediate nodes + destination node traveled by
the message
Connected_devices

IDs of devices the message traveled through
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Table 4.3. Metadata Associated with ABE DTN App Message (Cont.).
Next_hash

If a source/intermediate node created a hash using kn, it
computes kn-1 and stores it in this attribute

isVerified

The destination node verifies the hash values created by source
and various relay nodes of the message and assigns a boolean
value to this attribute.

Figure 4.33. Message Metadata.

In Figure 4.27, upon clicking the “Enable” button, the application searches for
nearby Android devices. Once they are connected, the device ID is exchanged. Based on
the connected device ID, the application pulls all the encrypted messages from storage.
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While forwarding each message it creates a hash using the keychain and the IDs of both
the connected devices are computed and appended to “HashInfo” attribute. The
“Next_hash” attribute is computed and stored. The connected device’s ID is appended to
the “Connected_devices” attribute and “Num_nodes_travelled” attribute is increased by
one. Once all these attributes are updated for a message, it is transferred to the other device
including the encrypted message as a stream.

Figure 4.34. Object Detection Performance Analysis.

Similarly, the device also receives encrypted messages from the connected device.
If the device is able to decrypt the encrypted message then it is the destination for that
message and does not forward to any other device in the future. The retrieved image is
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stored in the device’s storage and encrypted message stream is discarded. The decrypted
message can be viewed by clicking on “Received msgs” from Spinner in ActionBar in
Figure 4.31. On clicking a received message, the retrieved image and metadata are
displayed as shown in Figure 4.33. The “Hash details” display “HashInfo” attribute of a
message for the demo purposes. If the device is not able to decrypt an encrypted message
received it stores them as an intermediate message and forwards it to other devices in the
future.

Figure 4.35. ABE Encryption/Decryption Analysis.

4.3.3. Performance Analysis. As mentioned in the implementation details of [2]
the tool called “Profiler” in Android Studio IDE is used for performance analysis of the
app. The app is analyzed for object detection module and encryption/decryption using [3]
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for images. Figure 4.34 displays the analysis of the object detection module of the app. The
object detection module heavily consumes the device battery. On average it consumes 63%
of the CPU utilization. It uses an average of 110MB of memory when its performing object
detection on a live feed from the device’s camera. Figure 4.35 displays the performance
analysis of the encryption/decryption process using ABE.
The analysis has been done for encryption/decryption of a single message. The app
consumes almost 45% of the CPU utilization and uses an average of 60MB for internal
memory. The energy consumption is of “medium” level while performing those operations.
The analysis has been done on Pixel 2 virtual device running on Android Pie 9.0 (API 28).

62
5. CONCLUSION

Three DTN protocols [1], [2] and [3] are implemented on the Android platform as
an app. The apps use various available peer-to-peer networking technologies to
communicate with nearby devices. The protocols [1], [2] and [3] in DTN are experimented
in real-time scenarios by running tests with a number of Android devices with the
respective apps and that shows the usability and effectiveness of these protocols in
disaster/battlefield applications. These protocols provide better content management and
cybersecurity in DTN environment. Furthermore, we have explored the models for object
detection using deep learning and integrating them with the Android platform, and
implemented one of the mobile-friendly object detection models SSDLite MobileNet V2
for soldier detection. The object detection helps in routing the appropriate data satisfying
the access control policies in DTN environment. The codes for all the 3 projects are
available at [21].
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